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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a case filed by Black Diamond Alliance LLC (Black Diamond) for the ejectment 
of Sheny Kimball (Kilnball) from her home following a disputed Trustee's sale. 
B. Procedural History. 
A Complaint was filed on July 6, 2007, on behalf of "Black Dia~nond, LLC" requesting 
the Court to eject Kimball from her home located at 2746 W. 17" S, Idaho Falls, Idaho 
(hereinafter referred to as "the property."). R. p. 5. An Amended Complaint was filed on August 
17,2009. Black Diamond claimed, as the successhl bidder at a Trustee's sale, that they were 
entitled to possession and control of the property. R. p. 10. 
On November 7,2007, Kimball filed her Answer and Counterclaim. Among the defenses 
raised by Kimball was that the Trustee's sale was not conducted in conformity with Idaho law 
and that Black Diamond was not the real party in interest. R. p. 16. Black Diamond filed their 
Reply to the Counterclaim on November 20,2007. R. p. 25. 
On January 18,2008, Black Diamond moved for Sumnary Judgment with supporting 
Affidavits. R. p. 27. Kimball, on February 15,2008, filed her opposition to Summary Judgnent 
and filed Affidavits in opposition to the same. R pp. 45 and 104. Black Diamond thereafter 
filed its Reply brief and a hearing was held on March 6,2008. R. p. 54. 
On March 6,2008, the hearing on Black Diamond's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
held. The District Court ruled fro111 the bench and granted summary judgment to Black 
Diamond. Tr. p. 20 LL. 15-17 March 6,2008 . On March 12,2008, a Motion for 
Reconsideration was filed by I(imbal1. R. p. 66. To preserve her rights to appeal, Kilnball filed a 
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Notice of Appeal on April 2,2008. R. p. 71. On May 15,2008, the Court heard the Motion for 
Reconsideration, granted the same and vacated the Summary Judgment previously entered.R. p. 
101. 
On June 4,2008, Black Diamond filed its Motion for Reconsideration. Supp. R. p. 11. 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the Supreme Court suspended the appeal on July 9, 
2008. Supp. R. p. 13. On August 25,2008, Black Diamond inoved again for partial summary 
judgment. Supp. R. p. 30. After hearing, the District Court re-entered summary judgment in 
favor of Black Diamond. Supp. R. p. 167. The final issue was resolved by summary judgment in 
favor of Black Diainond on January 15,2009, after which this appeal was pursued. Supp. R. p. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Kimball purchased a home and real property located at 2746 West, 17th South, Idaho 
Falls, Idaho on August 30,1988. Subsequently, she later refinanced her property through Wells 
Fargo Bank, who assigned the promissory note and deed of trust to Fremont Investnlent & Loan 
(hereinafter referred to as "Freinont."). In the latter part of 2007, ICiinball fell behind ill her 
payments under the Deed of Trust Note, and Fremont comtnenced a non-judicial foreclosure 
proceeding. ICimball was properly notified of the Trustee's Sale scheduled for May 29,2008. 
Affidavit of Sherry Kimball f i  4 filed 2-1 8-2008. (treated by the District Court Clerk for the 
Rewrd as an Exhibit R. p. 104.) 
Kimball had in excess of $136,000.00 equity in the house and contacted Freinont to 
discuss and work out a solution so she could keep her property. In addition, Kimball disputed the 
amount owed and faxed copies of checks that were not credited to her account. On the day of the 
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sale, Kimball again telephoned Fremont in a last ditch effort to avoid the sale. Kimball was 
successful in obtaining an agreement where in exchange for $3,000.00 ICimball would have until 
June 18, 2008 to pay the balance on the note. Fremont also told ICimball that the Trustee's sale 
would be cancelled. 
After sending the $3,000.00 to Freinont, who deposited the funds, Kimball telephoned Just 
Law Office, who was the Trustee, to ensure that they were aware of the cancellation of sale. 
I(iinbaI1 was referred to and spoke with Bradon Howell at the Trustee's office, who confirmed 
that the sale was cancelled. Bradon Howell did not infonn Kimball of a new sale date and time. 
Kimball Aff. 'j'j 6-8. Bradon Howell did email First American Title Company (First American) 
and indicated that the sale would be rescheduled for June 12,2008. R. p. 138 LL. 20-24. Black 
Diamond's Affidavits indicate that First American, at the time of the originally scheduled sale, 
indicated that the Trustee's sale would be held on June 12,2008, pursuant to the instructions of 
the Trustee, through Bradon Howell. (Affidavit of First American Title filed 1-18-2008, of 
Record as exhibit, R. p. 104.) Kirnball was not in attendance since it was her understanding that 
the sale had been cancelled. She was completely unaware of the matters that took place at that 
time. Kimball Aff. 'jl 7-8, R. 76. No notices were sei~t to Kilnball; no attempts to telephone 
IGmball were made; there were no postings on the property, nor any other steps taken to provide 
notice to Kimball of the new Trustee's sale, date and time. Kimball Aff 7 1 0., Supp. R. p. 138 L. 
10-p.  139L. 17. 
On June 12, 2008, the Trustee's sale was conducted. Trent Tyler (hereinafter referred to as 
"Tyler."), an agent for Black Diaiiloiid, attended the sale, learning of the sale via a telephoile call 
from Dustin Howell, an employee of Black Diamond, to First American. Supp. R. p.102 L. 18 - 
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p. 103 L. 24. Others in attendance were familiar with Tyler and discussed Tyler's recent birthday. 
The other potential buyers made a few token bids and then allowed Mr. Tyler to take the bid, 
wishing Tyler a "happy birthday." R. p. 107 LL. 11-22. 
Tyler and Jayce I-Iowell are the managing members of Black Diamond, a company whose 
business is to purchase and sell distressed properties. Jayce Howell is a brother to Bradon Howell 
of the Trustee's office. After the sale, Tyler and Dustin Howell, yet another brother to Bradon and 
Jayce Howell, went on that same day or the next day, placed a pamphlet and a Post-It@ note from 
Black Diamond on the door of Kimball's home indicating they had purchased the house and real 
property, and requested Kilnhall to contact them. R. p. 108 L. 18 - p. L. 23. When ICimball 
returned home on June 13,2008 and saw the pamphlet and note, she immediately contacted both 
Dustin Howell at the number on the pamphlet and Bradon I-Iowell at the Trustee's office. She 
informed both of them that thc sale should not have taken place because of the additional time 
promised. Supp. R. pp. 76-77. 
Bradon Howell then contacted Fremont to discuss options, including redoing the sale. 
Fremont and the Trustee decided to record and deliver the Trustee's Deed' to Black Diamond. R. 
p. 144 L. 15 - p 145 L 18. Thereafter, Fremont sent Kimball a check for $3,000.00 sometime after 
June 20,2008. R. p. 23. Thereafter ICimball continued to assert ownership and refused to move 
from the property and the present action was coinmenced. 
After the commencement of the proceedings herein, an Amended Trustee's Deed was 
prepared to supposedly correct the purchaser/party to the action from "Black Diamond LLC" to 
"Black Diamond Alliance LLC." There is no LLC with the name "Black Diamond LLC" in 
Idaho. R. p. 43. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err, in both fact and law, in granting summary judgment to 
Black Diamond? 
A. Does a sale that has been postponed under Title 45, Chapter 15 require 
service or notice, other than being orally declared at  the time of the original 
Trustee's sale, to be given to an owner who has appeared or activity 
attempted to protect her property? 
B. Can Black Diamond be considered a good faith purchaser? 
STANDARD ON APPEAL. 
The appellate court has free review of the decisions of the District Court. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated: 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district 
court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Upon review, 
the Court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor 
of the nonnloving party, and draw all reasonable inferences from the 
record in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. If there are conflicting inferences 
contained in the record or reasonable minds might reach different 
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. 
Lochsrr Fnlls, L.L.C. v. Stute 2009 WL 918620 at *2 (Idaho) 
5- Appellant's Brief 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to Black Diamond. 
A. The District Court erred in concluding sufficient notice was given to Kimball of the 
subsequent sale. 
The District Judge erred, in both fact and law, in finding that the foreclosure sale herein 
was conducted according to the requirements of Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Idaho Code and the 
requirements of law. It is ulidisputed that no efforts were made to personally serve, notify or 
otherwise bring to the attention of Kimball the date and time of the June 12,2008, Trustee's sale. 
Nor were there any efforts to post the property or display any notice in any public place. R. pp. 
136-137. 
The District Court's summary judgment was based upon the position that Idaho Code $45- 
1507(8) requires only the oral declaration of the new date and time of the trustee's sale. This 
interpretation is incorrect under the statutory scheme of Title 45, chapter 15 which requires 
notification, at least under Idaho Code $45-1 506(7). Otherwise, due process requirements under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the 
Idaho State Constitution would be violated. KimbalI is not challenging the constitutionality of 
Idaho Code $45-1 508 as a whole, but only as to the facts and circumsta~ces of this case. 
To satisfy due process requirements, the notice provided must be "reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Iinnover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306,3 14 (1950). "Under both the Idaho a ~ d  United States Constitutions the right to 
procedural due process is guaranteed, requiring that a person involved in the judicial process be 
given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 
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666 P.2d 639 (1983)." Frontier FederalSa~i andLoan Ass'n v. Douglnss 123 Idaho 808,824, 
853 P.2d 553, 569 (Idaho, 1993)- Dissenting Opinion. The core of due process is notice and 
opportunity in a meaningfnl time and manner. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success 
Investments, LLC 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008). See also, Iferrera v. Estay 146 Idaho 
674,201 P.3d 647 (2009). The level of notice to be given, however, depends on the interest at 
issue because "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Strong distinctions lie in 
the law between those who are actively involved, like Kimball, versus those that "lie doggo."' 
Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698,703 (C.A.3 (Pa.),1999) 
The actioils of the Trustee deprived ICimball of all reasonable notice and opportunity and 
was in violation of an expressed agreement between IGinball and the beneficiary, for whom the 
Trustee was acting on behalf Requiring only a verbal announcement on May 29,2008 in light of 
I<imball's active attempt to prevent the loss of her property, clearly violates the due process 
requirements discussed herein. In addition, the same creates conflict within the non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes. For example, the subsequent sale could not be construed as final. Idaho 
Code §45-1508 states: 
Finality of Sale- A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and 
terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to 
whom notice is given under section 45-1506, Idaho Code, and of any other person 
claiming by, through or under such persons and such persons shall have no right to 
redeem the property from the purchaser at the trustee's sale. The failure to give 
notice to any of such persons by maiIing, personal service, posting or 
publication in accordance with section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect 
the validity of the sale as to persons so notified nor as to any such persons 
Definition: British Slang. "To keep out of sight; hide: Lie doggo until the excitement 
blows over." http://dictionary.refere1~ce.comibrowse/lie+2446 
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having actual knowledge of the sale. Furthennore, any failure to comply with the 
provisions of sectio~i 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of a sale in 
favor of a purchaser in good faith for value at or after such sale, or any successor in 
interest thereof. (Emphasis added) 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 845-1508, a trustee's sale only becomes final as to persons who 
have been: (a) adequately notified, (b) had actual knowledge, or (c) if the purchaser acquired the 
property in good faith. Kimball submits that the purpose of announcement at the time scheduled 
for the original sale is not necessarily to provide notice to the owner or other known persons, but 
to reach those who respond to public notifications, without requiring the delay and expense of 
republication. Ostrow v. Higgins, 722 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1986). The identity and address of the 
owner of the property, particularly residential property in which the owner personally resides for 
19 years, is well known and service or some reasonable effort to at least attempt service or give 
notice would be proper. Thus, ICimball submits that to withstand constitutio~~al muster, and to 
comply with Idaho law, the requirements of Idaho Code $45-1506(7) which requires mailing and 
posting, followed by an affidavit of mailing the notice of sale and an affidavit of posting should 
have been provided, a fortiori in this case because of Kimball's efforts to protect her equity. 
In this case, there would be no reason for Kimball to attend a cancelled sale (or one that 
she understood was cancelled). A letter, aposting on the door if no one was home, or even 
perhaps a telephone call to the property owner would be substantially better that an email between 
the trustee and a title company to arrange a new notice which the property owner would not be 
privy to. In Dusenbevy v. Unitedstates, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002), 
the sending of a certified letter was sufficient even if not received. See also Jones v. Flowers, 547 
U.S. 220, 126 S.Ct. 1708 (2006.). (After a mailed notice was returned unclaimed, a state was 
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to take additional reasonable 
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steps to notify the owner before the sale could proceed.) In this case, Kimball owned and 
occupied the subject property as her home for 19 years prior to the foreclosure. Her address and 
whereabouts were well known and notice could have easily been made in several ways, including 
those listed above. 
The Trustee provided no other reason or justification for not providing notice to Kimball. 
When pressed, the agent for the Trustee stated that "[als far as we hiow we don't have to. It's not 
law. And we still don't." Supp. R. p. 150. 
Idaho Code $45-1506(7) requires an affidavit of mailing notice of sale and an afiidavit of 
posting. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, perhaps by dicta, that sales postponed under $5 
45-1506 or 45-1506A require recorded affidavits certifying compliance with the notice 
requirements. Federal Ilome Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Appel 143 Idaho 42,47 n.3, 137 P.3d 429, 
434 n.3 (2006). 
ICimball submits that parallelisms could also be drawn to similar situations in Idaho Law. 
For example, pursuant to IRCP 55(b)(2) when a person has appeared in a lawsuit, no default can 
take place prior to written notice being given three days in advance. There are also several 
statutes in Idaho where persons can request notice to protect their interests and concerns in various 
proceedings. See e.g., Idaho Code $$ 7-1304, 15-3-505, 15-5-406. 
Providing of notice of a postponed sale is not difficult to do. The simple mailing of a 
letter and posting on the property do not require significant effort or expense or cause any 
significant delay. 
ICimball was active in her contacts with Fremont and the Trustee, attempting to work out 
an arrangement and disputing the amount of claimed balance. Eventually, in exchange for a 
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significant sum of money, Fremont deposited the funds and reported to Kimball that the sale was 
cancelled which was confirmed by the Tntstee when Kimball went even further by her telephone 
call to the Trustce. She then knew or believcd that no sale would take place until aRer June 18, 
2008 if she did not satisfy the obligation. When Kimball was notified that Black Diamond had 
purchased the property during the undisclosed sale, she immediately brought the notice deficiency 
to the Trustee's and Black Diamond's attention before the issuance of a Trustee's deed. 
However, rather than correcting the deficiency in a reasonable manner, i.e. scheduling another sale 
with notice lo Icimball, the Trustee prepared, recorded and delivered the Trustee's Deed to "Black 
Diamond, LLC" at a time when Black Diamond knew of the notice problems. 
I 
I In foreclosures, particularly in fact situations like this case, very substantial property 
I 
1 rights are affected and this Court needs to consider the extent of the interest in determining the 
I level of notice required. The application of the facts to the requirements of due process dictate 
I 
I that the Trustee's sale cannot stand. 
1 
j Based upon the requirements of due process, and considering the overall view of Idaho 
I non-judicial foreclosure laws, notice to the owner of the property, particularly one who has made 
efforts to actively participate in the foreclosure proceedings, is required. Because tlre Trustee 
failed to follow even minimal requirements, summary judgment in favor of Black Diamond 
should not have occurred. 
B. Black Diamond was not a good faith purchaser. 
i 
j Black Diamond was aware of the defects in the foreclosure process before the Trustee's 
' ,  
i Deed was recorded or delivered to Black Diamond, and therefore, cannot be a good faith 
i 
purchaser. Somewhat ironic is the fact that Black Diamond takes the position that even though 
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Kilnball received no notice of the sale, she is not entitled to any relief. Yet, Black Diamond also 
takes the position that even though they had notice of the procedural defects and claims of 
ICimball, they believe they should be considered a good faith purchaser. 
Black's Law Dictionary states that a bona fide purchaser for value is "[olne who purchases 
legal title to real property without actual or constructive notice of any infirmities, claims, or 
equities against the title." Black's Law Dictionary at 1001 (7th abr. ed. 2000). 
If a purchaser is on inquiry notice based if the circumstances indicate that potential defects 
of notice requirements exist, they cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser. See Fedeual Home 
Loan Mortg. Coup. v. Appel143 Idaho 42,47, 137 P.3d 429,434 ( 2006). In the present case, the 
following time line is significant: 
Mav 29.2008: Sherry reaches an agreement with Fremont to cancel the sale. She 
sends $3,000.00 to Fremont and confinns the cancellation with the Trustee. 
ICimball Aff. 77 6-7. 
June 12,2008: Trustee's sale takes place without Kimball's knowledge. Kimball 
Aff. 7 10. 
. June 13,2008: Black Diamond placed a pamphlet and note on Kimball's door 
indicating they bought her house at the Trustee's sale. Supp. R. 109. ICimball 
called Just Law Office (Trustee) and infonned them of the lack of notice of the 
Trustee's sale. Supp. R. 132-133. Kilnball also calls Black Diamond and notified 
them of the lack of notice of the Trustee's sale. Supp. R. 76-77. 
June 14,2008: Just Law Office called Fremont and gave the various options, 
including the option to conduct another Trustee's sale. Fremont instructs Trustee 
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to process the Trustee's Deed to Black Diamond. Supp. R. 136, 145. Just Law 
Office records Trustee's Deed. 
June 15,2008: Trustee's Deed sent to Black Diamond by Trustee. Supp. R. 144. 
June 20.2008: Frernont prepares and sends to ICimball. R. p. 23. 
Black Diamond knew of the problems with the notice of sale prior to either the creation, 
recording or receipt of the Trustee's Deed. Such knowledge prevents Black Diamond from 
becoming a bona fidelgood faith purchaser for value. "[Sltatus as a bona fide purchaser or a 
purchaser in good faith, at least in the context of a non-judicial foreclosure sale, is generally not 
available where a purchaser is on inquiry notice of a potential defect of statutory notice 
provisions." Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Appel143 Idaho 42,47, 137 P.3d 429,434 
(2006). In Federal Home, the Court specifically referenced the sale postponement in Idaho Code 
$45-1 506 and referenced the requirements. 
Black Diamond was aware of the lack of notice to Kimball and thus the defect in notice 
prior to the conveyance of the Trustee's Deed. Therefore, it cannot legitimately claim to be a 
good faith purchaser. In a case involving the same Trustee herein (and who is also representing 
Black Diamond herein), the Idaho Supreme Court has held that good faith purchaser status is only 
available " . . . in favor of a title, though it may be defective, which a bona fide purchaser has, and 
it is not available for the purpose of creating a title. " Taylor v. Just 138 Idaho 137, 142, 59 P.3d 
308, 313 (2002). The law is clear that the time for determining good faith is at the time of 
conveyance of the property. The property herein was not conveyed until after the defect was 
known to Black Diamond and the Trustee. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court is requested to reverse the decision of the District 
Court and direct the vacating of the surninary judgment herein. 
DATED: June 10,2009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and accurate copies of the foregoing was served by 
placing the copies in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid on June 10,2009, addressed to the following: 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Just Law Office 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271 
Hand Delivery 
c/?------ 
David A. J&son, Esq. 
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